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Private Governance and the South:
lessons from global forest politics
PHILIPP PATTBERG
ABSTRACT Private governance beyond the state is emerging as a prominent
debate in International Relations, focusing on the activities of private non-state
actors and the inﬂuences of private rules and standards. However, the
conceptual framework of governance has until recently been employed
predominantly with reference to the OECD world. Despite this restricted view,
a growing number of processes, organisations and institutions are beginning to
aﬀect developing countries and new institutional settings open up avenues of
inﬂuence for actors from the South. In the context of a lively debate about
global governance and the transformation of world politics, this article asks:
what inﬂuences does private governance have on developing countries, their
societies and their economies? What inﬂuence do southern actors have in and
through private governance arrangements? I argue that we can assess the speciﬁc
impacts of private governance, as well as potential avenues of inﬂuence for
actors from the South, with regard to three functional pathways: governance
through regulation, governance through learning and discourse, and governance
through integration. Focusing in particular on private governance in the global
forest arena, I argue that, while southern actors have not beneﬁted so much
economically from private certiﬁcation schemes, they have been partially
empowered through cognitive and integrative processes of governance.
Private approaches towards global forest politics are frequently evoked as
prime examples of the large-scale shift from public to transnational forms
of governance.1 Unlike the international eﬀorts towards a binding global
forest convention that ended in an institutionalised stalemate, the private
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) successfully took shape in 1993. More than
a decade later, the FSC has certiﬁed over 68 million hectares of forest
according to its own sustainability standards in 80 countries.2 In addition, the
FSC has not only proven to be a successful model of private rule making and
implementation in the forestry arena, but also has diﬀused to other issue
areas such as marine conservation, aquaculture, tourism and mining.
However, private approaches to global politics raise substantial questions
when it comes to their actual limitations and potential as providers of public
goods. In particular, it is not clear whether the FSC integrates concerns
beyond the OECD world into the system of global governance or if it rather
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beneﬁts the northern global players, both companies and NGOs. This article
attempts to assess what we can learn from the ﬁrst 10 years of private forest
politics with regard to the integration of the South into the system of global
governance.
In particular, I analyse the impacts of private governance on the South and
the implications of shortcomings of private governance for the South. The
argument proceeds in three steps. The next section discusses the concept of
private governance and the potential inﬂuences of such governance on actors
in the South. Subsequently, the third section analyses in more detail the arena
of private forest politics and examines how its distinct functions aﬀect public,
civil society and business actors in the South and how southern actors and
interests are potentially integrated into the system of private forest
governance. The ﬁnal section concludes with some general remarks on
shortcomings of the FSC and their implications for the South.
Private governance and the developing world
Private governance and authority beyond the state is emerging as a prominent
debate within the larger context of global governance research and Interna-
tional Relations (IR) in general.3 A ﬁrst wave of research has mainly focused on
the new roles of non-state actors in international policy making and
implementation. Non-state actors at the international level are found to be
involved, inter alia, in agenda setting, decision making, monitoring and
reporting, as well as in standard setting and rule implementation. Non-state
actors fall into three broad categories: public interest-oriented non-proﬁt actors,
proﬁt-oriented corporate actors and their associations, and public intergovern-
mental organisations.4 Among those non-state actors that capture the attention
of scholars, civil society institutions, transnational businesses, global scientiﬁc
networks and, more recently, international organisations and intergovern-
mental bureaucracies are the most prominent.5 However, research has mainly
focused on the inﬂuence of private actors on intergovernmental decision-
making processes as an intervening variable between state interests and
international policy outcomes. What is largely missing in current research is
attention paid to political processes that are both emanating from, as well as
directed towards, private non-state actors.
A second wave of research has been interested in the general phenomenon
of policy partnerships.6 Although this literature is rooted in domestic and
comparative politics, it has found its way into the study of IR. However, most
attention focuses on partnerships between public and non-state actors, such
as states, corporations and civil society organisations. These public – private
partnerships at the international level, sometimes also referred to as global
public policy networks, are active in rule setting, rule implementation and
service provision.7 Research that explicitly deals with partnerships between
private actors from a theoretical perspective is, however, rare. Most studies
instead address the engagement of private actors from a policy-oriented
perspective. In addition, when it comes to assessing the inﬂuence of
partnerships on the South, empirical studies have almost exclusively focused
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on partnerships that aim at implementing international agreements rather
than on those setting their own rules and standards.8
A third wave of research is increasingly interested in private rules and
norms, with reference both to normative and analytical questions.9 But,
despite the relative broadening of the private governance research agenda
from the initial focus on private actors to the current interest in institutional
questions of private rules and regulations, most empirical work has focused
on transnational governance within the OECD world. What is missing is an
assessment of private governance within the context of North – South
relations and development studies.
Before I engage in a discussion of the possible ways private governance
arrangements may inﬂuence actors from the South, let us brieﬂy consider
what the term ‘private governance’ refers to in the general context of global
governance research. Although the intellectual ﬁeld of private governance is
far from being suﬃciently mapped, and major room exists for contending
deﬁnitions and understandings, both with regard to theory and empirical
phenomena, some basic constitutive elements of private governance as the
central theoretical approach to new institutional forms of rule making and
implementation beyond the state can be identiﬁed. First, private governance
centres on rules and regulation, not on spontaneous, unco-ordinated
behaviour such as market interactions. Second, private governance may
contain processes and instances of institutionalisation beyond co-operation
between diﬀerent non-state actors. Finally, private governance potentially
organises political spaces equivalent to public steering mechanisms.
As a result, there is growing agreement that private governance emerges
next to public and hybrid forms of steering. Private governance ‘emerges at
the global level where the interactions among private actors . . . give rise to
institutional arrangements that structure and direct actors’ behavior in an
issue-speciﬁc area’.10 The result of this institutionalisation among a wide
range of private actors can be understood as a functional equivalent of the
public governing functions of states and international organisations. But
private governance should not be equated with mere co-operation between
various private actors. In the words of Robert Falkner11:
Cooperation requires the adjustment of individual behavior to achieve mutual
beneﬁcial objectives . . . It is mostly of an ad hoc nature with a short lifetime.
Governance, however, emerges out of a context of interaction that is
institutionalised and of more permanent nature. In a system of governance,
individual actors do not constantly decide to be bound by the institutional
norms based on a calculation of their interest, but adjust their behavior out of
recognition of the legitimacy of the governance system.
Having discussed the general concept of private governance, how then do
speciﬁc private rules and the actors sustaining these rules inﬂuence the South?
The inﬂuence of private governance on any level of the political system can
be assessed as changes in the behaviour of targeted actors and those actors
that have at least some kind of structural relation to the source of
governance. To introduce some order to the many possible behavioural
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changes attributable to private governance, several functional pathways can
be distinguished through which the governance task is achieved. Starting with
the most evident, behavioural changes result from the regulative function of
private governance. In this view, behavioural changes can be attributed to the
standards and regulations emanating from a private governance arrangement
that are directed towards business actors, including forest managers and
producers, and indirectly also to traders and retailers. Possible eﬀects include
changes in markets and economic incentive structures, environmental
improvements or deterioration and impacts on social parameters such as
working conditions and labour rights. Next to regulation, private governance
is also achieved through a cognitive/discursive function. In this view, know-
ledge is produced and disseminated through a network of actors bound together
by the constitutive rules of the institution. In addition, learning processes may
occur that enable actors to fulﬁl new roles and take over new responsibilities.
The third function through which private governance is thought to occur is
integration. In this case, norms are transcended from the international to the
transnational level and vice-versa. Therefore, behavioural changes that occur as
the result of the integrative function of private governance may include public
policies at the national and international level, as well as instances of
endorsement or emulation of private governance by other actors of the political
system such as states or international organisations.
In sum, applying the concept of private governance to instances of
transnational rule making at the global level directs our attention to the
process of steering through regulation and the corresponding outcome of
issue-speciﬁc and geographically fragmented organisation beyond the state.
Through the heuristic tool of disaggregating private governance in its
regulative, cognitive and integrative function, it seems possible to system-
atically assess the inﬂuence of private forest governance on the South, as well
as the potential for integrating southern concerns into private governance.
Private governance and the South: analysing the forestry arena
The FSC is one of more than 20 certiﬁcation schemes operating in global
forestry today. It serves as a particularly good empirical case, because it has
been deliberately built around the principle of sustainable development and is
frequently credited with successfully integrating civil society concerns and the
interests of developing countries through its unique three-chamber governing
structure.12 The FSC was founded, after two years of strategic discussion, in
1993. It was formed as the ﬁrst private regulatory scheme in the forestry
sector with an explicit global focus. The emergence of forest certiﬁcation as
private governance involved two sets of dynamics.13 First, social movement
campaigns against corporate behaviour created the demand for credible and
transparent information systems to meet the growing critical consumer
demand. The second inﬂuential dynamic was the coincidence of international
deadlock on the issue of sustainable forestry and the emerging neoliberal
‘lean-state’ paradigm that favoured private and voluntary approaches over
binding public ones.
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The ‘Principles and Criteria (P&C), the rules agreed on after the founding
meeting in Toronto in October 1993, form the basis of the FSC’s work. They
deﬁne which practices are considered socially beneﬁcial, environmentally
appropriate and economically viable. The principles require, for example,
compliance with all applicable national laws and international treaties and
agreements, including the provisions of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the International Tropical Timber
Agreement (ITTA) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
(principle 1). They also require the recognition and respect of the rights of
indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands (principle 3),
maintenance of the long-term social and economic well-being of forest
workers and local communities (principle 4) and the conservation of
biological diversity and other non-monetary values (principle 6).14 During
the 13 years it has existed, the FSC has also developed detailed procedural
rules for sustainable forestry.
Organisational structure
I will now brieﬂy analyse the FSC’s governance structure and operation with
regard to the question of North/South representation.15 The General
Assembly (GA), a tripartite body that represents business, social and
environmental interests within three chambers, governs the FSC. Each
chamber holds equal voting power of 33.3%; internally they have a 50%
quorum for North and South representation. As a consequence, each
chamber is subdivided in a northern and southern division in which
organisational members have 90% of the sub-chamber vote, while individual
members hold the remaining 10%.16 Table 1 shows the current membership
pattern accurate as of February 2006.
While environmental interests are relatively balanced, economic interests
are clearly biased against the South, and social concerns are relatively
underdeveloped. Thanks to the three-chamber voting system and the 50%
quorum, this representation structure does not lead to formal under-
representation but to a structural advantage for the South. However, larger
northern membership may lead to discursive disadvantages for actors from
the South, especially for social organisations.
The GA’s main function is to elect a board of directors that mirrors the
tripartite structure. Each chamber elects three members to the board for a
three-year term. The representation of northern and southern countries
TABLE 1. General Assembly membership according to chamber and geographic
origin
General Assembly Env Eco Soc Total
North 117 162 59 338
South 136 109 52 297
Total 253 271 111 635
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alternates between four and ﬁve, changing every three years. As of February
2006 the North/South ratio on the board is 4:5. The board decides on all
issues of major importance, from approving national representatives and FSC
initiatives, to allocating the annual budget, to approving new standards. The
operational work of the FSC is handled by the FSC international secretariat
located in Bonn, Germany, and supervised by the Executive Director who is
appointed by and responsible to the board.
The FSC is organised in several operational layers that are connected
through the substantive rules of the institution. Next to the FSC international
secretariat there are regional oﬃces and a number of national FSC processes
which, after they have received accreditation by the FSC board, become
national initiatives that develop appropriate national FSC standards based on
the P&C. In 2006 13 national initiatives out of 36 are located in developing
countries. To react to the speciﬁc demands and concerns of national
initiatives, and to better integrate the valuable knowledge of respective
stakeholders, the FSC has set up four regional oﬃces in Europe, Africa, Asia
and Latin America. The regional oﬃces act as focal points for the national
initiatives within that particular region and, as a result, create the
opportunity for discussions on topics of common concern. Southern interest
can thus be appropriately developed and formulated. For example,
discussions within the regional oﬃce for Latin America have raised concern
about the diﬀerent importance attached to social issues in the region and in
the FSC international. Participants felt that in European debates measurable
environmental impacts were of most importance, while concerns about social
and cultural matters featured relatively low on the agenda. In contrast to this
environmental and economic focus, stakeholders in Latin America emphasise
the importance of addressing cultural and spiritual needs in achieving
sustainable forestry.17
After this broad overview, I now turn to the speciﬁc impacts of private
governance on the South. To assess the diﬀerent ways southern concerns may
or may not be aﬀected by private governance, I subsequently discuss the
regulative, cognitive and integrative functions of the FSC with regard to the
South.
Governance through regulation: who is paying the price?
One prime function of the FSC as an example of private governance is to
develop and implement detailed rules for sustainable forest management
(SFM). As a rule maker the FSC produces three diﬀerent types of standards,
which constitute the regulatory output of the institution.18 First, global forest
management standards that form the basis of national and regional
standards development; second, chain of custody standards (COC) setting
detailed rules along the production chain; and third, standards for the
accreditation of independent certiﬁers. The standard setting procedure
involves consultations with relevant stakeholders and explicit provision is
made to ensure ‘that stakeholders whose interests are often marginalised are
empowered to take a full and active part in the development of standards’.19
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Southern concerns are potentially integrated in the standard-setting process
in two ways: ﬁrst, through the stakeholder consultations at the international
level; and, more importantly, through the national standard-setting processes
that mirror the international procedure and can adapt the generic
international P&C to national and often local circumstances. Thanks to this
ﬂexibility in the standard-setting process, the interests of southern stake-
holders are not disadvantaged against northern ones.
In January 2006 some 68 million hectares of forest area world-wide were
certiﬁed in FSC terms.20 The 15 certiﬁcation bodies (CBs) accredited by the FSC
have issued more than 5000 certiﬁcates to forestry companies and businesses.
However, there is cause formajor scepticism, especially with regard to the South.
According to the FSC bylaws in their current version, the FSC ‘shall promote
environmentally appropriate, socially beneﬁcial, and economically viable
management of the world’s forests’.21 Paragraph 8 speciﬁes: ‘the FSC Principles
and Criteria are intended to apply without discrimination to tropical, temperate
and boreal forests worldwide which are managed for production of forest
products’.22 However, actual ﬁgures look somehow diﬀerent. Currently 82.3%
of the certiﬁed area is in Europe andNorthAmerica, while Africa, Asia, Oceania
and Latin America account for only 17.7%.23 Table 2 provides an overview of
the current status of FSC certiﬁed area, forest management and COC certiﬁcates
by geographic origin as at January 2006.
The reason for the North – South disparity is partially explained by
inadequate infrastructure and economic disequilibria in developing countries.
It is not diﬃcult for well organised forestry companies in temperate regions
to meet the FSC standards and criteria as the core standards of forestry have
primarily been developed in Western Europe. In contrast, tropical forests
often do not have the infrastructure to facilitate certiﬁcation. An unintended
consequence of this uneven distribution of certiﬁed forest area could well be
the institutionalisation of trade barriers between developing and industria-
lised countries, a fear that is frequently raised in debates about forest
certiﬁcation. And with only 6%–8% of global timber production entering
international trade, a majority taking place between countries of the same
region, and environmentally sensitive markets only existing in Europe and
North America, producers from developing countries have signiﬁcantly less
access to premium markets. Consequently, their incentive to seek costly
certiﬁcation is relatively low and will depend on the size of the forest
operation. With regard to the FSC’s goal of environmentally appropriate
forest management, and the important role of biodiversity therein, this state
of aﬀairs could become a signiﬁcant backdrop to the FSC’s own objective.
Under these circumstances, the extent to which forest managers will seek
FSC certiﬁcation in the future is uncertain. The initial expectation of most
forest managers and timber exporters with regard to certiﬁcation has been a
rise in proﬁts through premium prices. However, there seems to be no sign of
higher prices in general. A recent study from the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED) ﬁnds that premium prices are rare in
do-it-yourself (DIY) retailer supply chains. The only situation where premium
prices for certiﬁed timber have occurred is ‘when there has been a mismatch
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between supply and demand, if buyers are competing for certiﬁed wood
with few sources’.24 However, the same report acknowledges that there have
been instances of enduring premium prices for tropical hardwood. For
example, producers from Brazil and Papua New Guinea report that they are
receiving premium of up to 20% for well known commercial species.25 In
sum, the incentive structures prevalent in most tropical countries do not lend
support to the assumption that there will be rapid increases in the area of FSC
certiﬁed forests in the near future, although premium markets may exist in
some areas for some time.
A second question with regard to the impact of private governance on the
South next to premium prices is: who bears the costs of certiﬁcation? With
regard to the direct costs that result from forest management certiﬁcation
there is evidence that certiﬁcation in the tropics is more costly than in
temperate or boreal forest for two reasons. First, non-tropical forests are less
complex and thus require less auditing time and preparation. Second,
temperate and boreal forests often already have some well established
management procedures in place. Consequently, raising management
standards to the required level is less costly. In addition, smaller forests
also seem to be disadvantaged. A study of six natural forest areas in Latin
America found certiﬁcation costs for small-scale forestry to be up to four
times higher than for larger operations.26 Bass and colleagues conclude that
‘for the most part, costs borne at the producer end of the chain have not been
passed on to buyers in the retail sector’.27 In sum, few producers have been
able to receive a premium from FSC certiﬁcation or to shift costs to retailers
and consumers. However, while certiﬁcation does not lead to higher proﬁts it
may guarantee markets or even increase existing markets.
Next to large industrial operations, small-scale community forestry is of
particular importance in the South.28 Community forestry diﬀers from larger
corporate-driven enterprises in four ways. First, management practices are
often informal and limited; second, harvesting is on a smaller scale, often as
the result of limited ﬁnancial resources; third, commercial activities are
sporadic, often occurring in times of agricultural inactivity; and fourth,
community forestry is often located in remote geographic areas. Case studies
from Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, Zambia and Papua New Guinea have
found that, as a result of these diﬀerences, in some cases private regulation
has shifted the perception of ‘good forest management’ towards Western,
scientiﬁc standards. However, the economic eﬀects of certiﬁcation have been
rather limited to date. The study concludes that ‘although there have been
some positive experiences, most community enterprises have yet to see a
signiﬁcant increase in their income following certiﬁcation’.29 In most cases,
initial certiﬁcation created higher costs. The funds to implement costly
certiﬁcation standards came predominantly from external sources. In some
cases, communities have used certiﬁcation to attract additional funds from
developing agencies and NGOs, in other cases, certiﬁcation has been a
condition of future support. In sum, similar to larger forestry operations, the
initial expectation of premium prices for certiﬁed timber has not been
fulﬁlled. As costs are concentrated at the lower end of the supply chain,
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certiﬁcation of community forestry could only make modest inroads because
donors were willing to fund the extra costs. However, private governance
through forestry regulation has shifted professional perceptions and thereby
supported convergence within the forestry sector.
To conclude, the impact of private forest governance on the South through
its regulative function can be summarised in three points. First, analysis of
the FSC’s geographic representation has drawn our attention to the fact that
private governance in the form of certiﬁcation may systematically beneﬁt
some types of actor, while it clearly disadvantages other players in the ﬁeld.
For northern companies compliance with relatively tight regulative standards
is easy compared to the situation for those in developing countries, because
the regulative environment is already tight in industrial nations and key
concepts such as sustainability have—to a large extent—originated in
Western societies. As a result, private environmental and social regulation
could rather be considered a strategy tool for companies to drive others out
of the valuable ‘green’ market than a substantial steering mechanism towards
sustainability.
Second, and substantiating the former claim, producers in the South have
been largely unable to secure premium prices for certiﬁed timber. To the
contrary, the costs of certiﬁcation are concentrated at the lower end of the
supply chain because of the power of large retailers in the North. Rather than
resulting in higher proﬁts through a premium, certiﬁcation has helped
southern companies to access new markets or at least to guarantee existing
ones. As a general observation, private governance through certiﬁcation has
more impact on countries that have strong export markets to Europe and the
USA, while countries with rather weak ties to green markets are less aﬀected.
And ﬁnally, private forest governance has resulted in a shift of perceptions
towards sustainable forestry at the local level, in particular in community
forestry. This shift towards a more ‘scientiﬁc’ understanding of forestry
underscores the general trend of convergence in global forestry discourses
and practices.
Governance through learning and discourse: a network for change?
The second function through which the FSC gains inﬂuence in the South is
producing and disseminating knowledge, providing the institutional setting
for learning processes and the diﬀusion of the regulative model. This
cognitive function is a result of the FSC’s distinct network structure and the
speciﬁc roles and responsibilities that inﬂuence the behaviour of a range of
actors outside the narrower reach of rule making and regulation via
standards.
Through its network structure and the diﬀerent organisational levels—the
international secretariat, the regional oﬃces and the national working groups
and initiates—the FSC produces and disseminates information to a wide
range of stakeholders. This function is of particular importance for actors
from the South because certiﬁcation of tropical forests, especially in small-
scale operations, requires more informational capacities than well organised
PHILIPP PATTBERG
588
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
1:
38
 1
0 
Ju
ne
 2
01
1
commercial forest management. Partially in response to these demands, the
FSC has successfully implemented regional oﬃces to help producers and local
communities to get adequate and up-to-date information.30
An additional impact of private governance on the South is realised
through learning processes occurring within the FSC and among its members
and stakeholders. The institutional structure of the FSC facilitates two types
of learning processes. The ﬁrst could be described as intra-organisational
learning and includes processes of self-evaluation and resulting organisa-
tional restructuring.31 What is more interesting in the context of private
governance and its inﬂuence on the South is the second type of learning,
labelled inter-organisational learning.
From this perspective, the FSC constitutes the institutional core of a wider
learning network, including members, stakeholders and the general public.
This organisational diversity, both in structure and content, seems to
facilitate eﬀective social learning processes. Consider the example of leading
retailers of wood products. It was the speciﬁc structure of the FSC as a
network of local, regional and global organisations that has led to successful
learning. Only the involvement of local and regional experts, forest managers
and producers enabled retailers to learn about the many unnecessary
intermediate and potentially illegal traders participating in the business. The
result was a cheaper product for the retailers and at the same time a higher
proﬁt margin for local producers and managers in the South.32 But network
learning processes within the FSC do not only occur because dissimilar
organisations learn about possible win-win situations. They also occur
because similar organisations learn from dissimilar procedures and chal-
lenges. The general assembly and other formal or informal meetings between
stakeholders at all levels of the FSC structure provide opportunities for
learning that would not exist in the absence of the network. Social
organisations such as trade unions or indigenous peoples’ associations meet
environmental NGOs to exchange strategies and substantive information. As
a result, organisations often enrich their strategic toolkit as well as their
general organisational culture. For historic reasons the environmental
chamber of the FSC has been the best organised in terms of resource
mobilisation, shared visions and resulting policy motions. However, business
and social interests are catching up as a direct result of learning within the
FSC network. For southern actors the FSC network is a relatively successful
source of empowerment. In addition to learning about new strategies and
important developments, southern actors also gain access to major players in
the ﬁeld which would be costly and time consuming to contact on their own.
However, whether southern voices, especially those of environmental and
social groups, can really gain inﬂuence on crucial decisions remains to be
seen.
Governance through integration: the legalisation of functional spaces
The third function through which private governance gains inﬂuence in the
South is integration. This concept has a twofold connotation: ﬁrst,
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integration refers to the transformation of international or transnational
norms and standards to the level of private governance. The impact on actors
in the South is mainly a ‘legalisation’ of functional spaces wherein rules
become enforceable (through the process of certiﬁcation and the threat of
withdrawing the respective certiﬁcate) that were not or only reluctantly
enforced beforehand. Second, integration refers to FSC principles and their
underlying rationale being integrated into national political systems or
international agreements. In this case, governments may endorse FSC
standards, former state functions may be outsourced to the FSC, or public
policies, at both the national and international level, may be inﬂuenced by the
operation of the FSC. Closely connected to the latter mechanism, formerly
marginalised actors may gain access to policy debates and decisions at the
national or local level.
Assessing the ﬁrst mode of integration, the inﬂuence on actors in the South
is potentially high, but robust data to substantiate this claim are largely
missing. The FSC P&C demands that ‘in signatory countries, the provisions of
all binding international agreements such as CITES, ILO Conventions, ITTA
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, shall be respected’.33 The recent
inclusion of the core International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions
into the FSC standards is of particular importance because government
compliance with these treaties has been relatively weak in many developing
countries.34 A second example for the integration of international or
transnational norms into the FSC framework and the resulting impact on
actors in the South can be found in the FSC accreditation standards for CBs
that comply with the regulations of the International Standards Organization
(ISO). Case studies from South Africa, for example, indicate that certiﬁcation
according to FSC standards was achieved more easily when ISO standards
were already in place. In eﬀect, the integration of existing standards beneﬁts
southern companies because costly conformance with multiple standards can
thus be avoided.
Turning to the integration of FSC standards into national political systems,
data are comparably scarce. However, three potential mechanisms can be
observed. A ﬁrst possibility is that governments endorse the FSC, for example
through public procurement policies. However, as a strong environmental
consciousness among voters and the general public is largely conﬁned to a
few OECD countries and governmental action to accommodate such views is
correspondingly limited, endorsement seems to have little impact on
developing countries.
A second form of integrating FSC standards into national systems seem to
have been more inﬂuential. South Africa has eﬀectively outsourced its forest
surveillance to the FSC as a consequence of its strict monitoring practices.
Potentially this strategy could well spread to other developing countries that
control considerable portions of its forests and seek some budgetary relief.
A third form of integration is better documented, namely the inﬂuence of
the FSC on national policies and the corresponding empowerment of actors in
national debates. The multi-stakeholder process of the FSC is credited with
having had a beneﬁcial inﬂuence on policy discussions and stakeholder
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relations, especially in countries with otherwise weak forestry governance. In
addition, a study on South Africa has revealed that stakeholder consultations
on forestry have contributed to bringing actors into national debates who
have so far been excluded.35 With regard to the actual inﬂuence of private
forest governance on national forest policies a recent study argues that, while
certiﬁcation has in most cases been a complementary instrument to induce
compliance with national laws, ‘in countries like Bolivia, there has been a
more interactive process between recent legal forest reforms and certiﬁcation,
where incentives to landowners that engage in certiﬁcation have been
speciﬁcally introduced into the forestry law’.36 A second example is Mexico,
which has reacted to the increase of FSC certiﬁcation occurring after 1996 (the
FSC’S headquarters were situated in Oaxaca until 2002) with a national
forestry law closely mirroring the FSC standards on SFM.
In sum, although robust data are still scarce, some preliminary conclusions
can be drawn with regard to the integrative function of private governance
and its impact on the South. First, the integration of international norms
may strengthen national compliance practices within and beyond the forest
policy arena. Second, the multi-stakeholder idea embedded in the FSC may
empower hitherto marginalised actors in national debates. In addition,
private certiﬁcation may provide stimulus to public forest policies and
thereby further strengthen SFM.
Conclusion
In this article I have oﬀered a preliminary assessment of the impacts of
private governance on actors in the South. Taking the emerging arena of
private forest politics as an example, and of the Forest Stewardship Council
as its most prominent embodiment, I have analysed the risks as well as the
potential of private governance for the South. The impact of private
governance, broadly deﬁned as a form of socio-political steering in which
private actors are directly involved in regulating—in the form of standards or
more general normative guidance—the behaviour of a distinct group of
stakeholders, can be analysed along three functional dimensions.
First, private governance is realised through regulation emanating from
the distinct sustainable forestry standards developed and implemented by the
FSC. The analysis has shown that the costs of certiﬁcation have been shifted
to the producers, while the initially expected beneﬁt of premium prices for
certiﬁed timber has only emerged sporadically. In addition, the ecological
impact of private forest governance in the South is uncertain. It seems that
certiﬁcation has further improved well managed forest operations, while it
seems to have had little impact on the laggards in the forest business.
However, the FSC had quite a signiﬁcant impact on small-scale community
forestry, where it shifted perceptions of forestry towards more scientiﬁc views
and thus supported ongoing trends towards convergence in global forest
practices.
Learning and knowledge brokering have been presented as a second
possible function of private governance. The analysis suggests that learning
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processes have occurred within the FSC network and, as a result, have
potentially empowered NGOs from the South. In particular, environmental
and social organisations have beneﬁted from exchange over new strategies
and access to new forums.
The third functional pathway through which private governance is realised
is integration. With regard to the FSC, two tentative conclusions can be
drawn. First, the integration of international norms via the FSC may lead to
better enforcement on the national level. Second, the multi-stakeholder idea
embedded in the FSC may empower hitherto marginalised actors in national
debates and thereby strengthen sustainable forest management in national
policies.
Although some general trends seem to be visible, this article can be nothing
more than a ﬁrst step. Future research is therefore needed. From my point of
view, such an endeavour should start with a systematic assessment of the
conditions favourable to private governance in the South, both within and
beyond the forest sector. Questions could focus on the role of political incentive
structures and political cultures, a country’s position in the global economy, as
well as on its integration into international governance arrangements.
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